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We study a repeated game with  asymmetric information  about a 
dynamic state of nature.  In the course of the game, the better informed 
player can communicate some or all of his information with the other.  Our 
model covers costly and/or bounded communication.  We characterize the 
set of equilibrium payoffs, and contrast these with the communication 
equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs. 
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 1. Introduction
Communication activities may resolve ineﬃciencies due to informa-
tion asymmetries between agents, but are themselves costly, e.g., due
to sending and processing costs. The study of optimal trade-oﬀs be-
tween the costs and the beneﬁts of communication is to a large extend
an open problem, and is the topic of this paper.
Communication equilibria, as proposed by Forges [For86] and My-
erson [Mye86], extend the rules of a game by adding communication
possibilities through arbitrary mechanisms at any stage of a multistage
game. This concept captures the largest set of implementable equilib-
ria when no restriction exists on the means of communication between
the players.
On the other hand, economic studies like Radner [Rad93] tell us that
in an organization like a ﬁrm, communication is a costly activity and
that a signiﬁcant amount of resources is devoted to it. In these struc-
tures, the constant need for information updating entails important
costs.
2Starting with Forges [For90] and B´ ar´ any [B´ ar92], a body of literature,
including Urbano and Vila [UV02], Ben-Porath [BP03], and Gerardi
[Ger04], studies models of decentralized communication. An important
conclusion of this literature is that—under various assumptions—all
communication equilibria can be implemented through preplay decen-
tralized communication procedures. Hence, decentralized communica-
tion schemes can be used without any loss of eﬃciency if we consider
that a ﬁnite number of communication stages entails negligible costs
compared to the payoﬀs of the game to be played. Since the costs of
communication cannot be explained by considering decentralized com-
munication schemes as opposed to centralized ones, a new archetype of
costly communication is needed.
This paper puts the emphasis on this need for information updating,
and studies the communication dynamics in a model where the states
of nature evolve through time. One player, the forecaster, has superior
information to the other player, the agent, about the stream of states of
nature. The forecaster may choose to send messages and take actions
at any stage, and both components are described as part of the action
set of the forecaster. A repeated game then takes place between the
forecaster, the agent, and nature. The agent’s actions at any stage
may depend on all past actions and on all past states of nature. The
forecaster’s actions may depend on all past actions and on all past
states of nature, but also on all future states of nature. Hence, the
forecaster’s actions include a payoﬀ component (since these actions
impact players’ payoﬀs), and an information component (since these
actions may inform the agent about future states of nature). At each
stage, the agent updates his information using his observation both of
the current state of nature and of the forecaster’s action.
A speciﬁcation of players’ strategies induces a joint dynamics on
three elements called also action triple: the states of nature, the fore-
caster’s actions, and the agent’s actions. We study this dynamics
3through the average distribution Q of these three elements. This dis-
tribution contains all expected time average statistics of action triples,
and is important for strategic purposes since all expected average pay-
oﬀs depend on players’ strategies through it only.
We characterize the set of distributions Q that are implementable
by any strategies of the forecaster and the agent. The fact that the
information used by the agent cannot exceed the information received
leads to an information-theoretic inequality expressed using the Shan-
non [Sha48] entropy function, and which we call the information con-
straint.
On the one hand, we prove that for all strategies of the forecaster
and the agent and for any n, the average distribution during the ﬁrst n
stages fulﬁlls the information constraint. On the other hand, we prove
that for any distribution Q that fulﬁlls the information constraint, there
exists a pair of strategies for the forecaster and the agent such that the
long-run average distribution of action triples is Q. Hence, the infor-
mation constraint fully characterizes the set of implementable distri-
butions.
Our result has implications for the measure of communication inef-
ﬁciencies, in games both with and without common-interests.
The set of equilibrium payoﬀs in our model is in general a proper
subset of the set of communication equilibria. This reﬂects the fact
that communication is a costly activity, which consumes part of the
player’s resources.
The cost of communication ineﬃciencies can be measured in games
with common-interests, where the Pareto payoﬀ for the team is the
natural solution concept. In the communication equilibrium extension
of our model, this Pareto payoﬀ corresponds to the ﬁrst-best in which
both players are perfectly informed of the state of nature at each stage.
In our game, the Pareto payoﬀ is in general strictly less than this ﬁrst-
best, and represents a “second-best” payoﬀ which takes into account
the implementation costs of communication processes.
4Section 2 presents the model and examples of problems of optimal
communication. Section 3 introduces the information constraint and
the main results. In Section 4 we prove that using mixed or correlated
strategies (instead of pure strategies) will not change the analysis. The
main results are proved in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 presents appli-
cations to games with and without common-interests, and we conclude
with a discussion in Section 8.
2. The model
Given a ﬁnite set A, ∆(A) represents the set of probability measures
over A, and |A| is the cardinality of A. Random variables will be
denoted by bold letters.
The ﬁnite set of states of nature is denoted by I. There are two
players: the forecaster, with ﬁnite action set J, and the agent, with
ﬁnite action set K. The stage payoﬀ functions are gf,ga: I×J×K → R
for the forecaster and for the agent, respectively. We assume |J| ≥ 2
so that possibilities of communication from the forecaster to the agent
exist.
In the repeated game, the forecaster is informed beforehand of all
future states of nature. At each stage, the chosen action may depend
on past actions, as well as on the whole sequence of states of nature. A
(pure) strategy for the forecaster is thus a sequence (σt)t of mappings
σt: IN × Jt−1 × Kt−1 → J, where σt describes the behavior at stage t.
The agent is informed of past realizations of nature and past actions
only. A (pure) strategy for the agent is thus a sequence (τt)t of map-
pings τt: It−1 × Jt−1 × Kt−1 → K, where τt describes the behavior at
stage t.
We assume that the sequence of states of nature is i.i.d.with stage law
µ. Let (it)t be random variables that represent the sequence of states
of nature. A pair of strategies σ,τ induces sequences of random vari-
ables (jt)t and (kt)t given by jt = σt((it)t,(j1,...,jt−1),(k1,...,kt−1))
and kt = τt((i1,...,it−1),(j1,...,jt−1),(k1,...,kt−1)). Let P ,σ,τ be
5the induced probability distribution over (I × J × K)N, and P t
 ,σ,τ the
marginal over stage t’s action triple.
The average distribution up to stage t is Qt





there is a strategy pair σ,τ such that Qt
 ,σ,τ → Q as t → ∞ we say
that Q is implementable and that the strategy pair σ,τ implements the
distribution Q.
2.1. Example: Coordination with nature. We consider a two-
player game with common-interests in which both players wish to co-
ordinate with nature. I = J = K = {0,1}, µ is uniform. The common





1 if i = j = k
0 otherwise









where nature chooses the matrix, the forecaster chooses the row, and
the agent chooses the column.
Consider the strategy of the forecaster that matches the state of
nature at every stage. This strategy conveys no information to the
agent about future states of nature. If the agent plays randomly, the















The corresponding expected average payoﬀ is 1
2.
Consider now the strategy of the forecaster that matches nature at
even stages, and plays the next stage of nature at odd ones. At even
6stages, the agent is informed of the stage of nature by the previous
action of the forecaster, and thus can match it. At odd stages, the
agent has no information on the stage of nature, and we assume he





















































The corresponding expected payoﬀ is 5
8. A natural question that arises
is what is the maximal payoﬀ that corresponds to an implementable
distribution.





















(with corresponding payoﬀ 4









7(with corresponding payoﬀ 0.82) is not implementable. Moreover, our
analysis enables us to compute the (unique) implementable distribution
that maximizes the corresponding payoﬀ, and describes the implement-





















with x satisfying H(x) + (1 − x)log2 3 = 1, where H is the entropy
function.1 Thus the corresponding payoﬀ equals x, which is approxi-
mately 0.81.
3. The information constraint
The entropy of a discrete random variable x of law p with values in
X measures its randomness, and also the quantity of information given
by its observation. Its value is
H(x) = −
 
x∈X p(x = x)logp(x = x)
where the logarithm is taken in basis 2 and 0log0 = 0 by convention.
If x,y is a pair of discrete random variables with joint law p and
values in X ×Y , the entropy of x given y measures the randomness of
x given the knowledge of y, or equivalently the quantity of information
yielded by the observation of x to an agent who knows y. Its value is
H(x|y) = −
 
x,y∈X×Y p(x = x,y = y)logp(x = x|y = y)
When we need to specify explicitly the probability Q of the probability
space under which the random variables x and y are deﬁned, we shall
use the notations HQ(x) and HQ(x|y).
The main property of additivity of entropies states that
H(x,y) = H(x|y) + H(y)
1The entropy function H is given by H(x) = −xlog2 x − (1 − x)log2(1 − x) for
0 < x < 1.
8Let Q be a distribution over I × J × K. We say that Q fulﬁlls the
information constraint when, considering a triple (i,j,k) of random
variables with joint law Q:
(1) HQ(i,j|k) ≥ HQ(i)
From the additivity of entropies, the information constraint can be
rewritten as
(2) HQ(j|i,k) ≥ HQ(i) − HQ(i|k)
The left-hand side of the inequality can be interpreted as the amount of
information received by the agent that observes the forecaster’s action,
j, given the observation of the state of nature i and his own action k.
It is then an amount of information sent by the forecaster to the agent.
The right-hand term of (2) is the diﬀerence between the randomness
of i and the randomness of i given the knowledge of k. It is thus the
reduction of uncertainty that k gives on i, or the amount of information
yielded by i on k. We interpret it as an amount of information used
by the agent on the state of nature.
Following this interpretation, the information constraint expresses
the fact that the information used by the agent cannot exceed the
information received from the forecaster.
Our ﬁrst result states that, given any pair of strategies (σ,τ), the
corresponding average distribution fulﬁlls the information constraint.
Theorem 1. For every strategy pair σ, τ, and t, Qt
 ,σ,τ fulﬁlls the
information constraint, and every implementable distribution fulﬁlls the
information constraint.
The next result shows a converse of the previous theorem when the
horizon of the game is large.
Theorem 2. Any distribution Q that fulﬁlls the information constraint
and has marginal µ on I is implementable.
9Together, Theorems 1 and 2 show that the information constraint
fully characterizes the set of implementable distributions.
4. Mixed and correlated strategies
The following result implies that the set of implementable distri-
butions cannot be expanded by considering mixed, or even correlated
strategies of the forecaster and the agent.
Theorem 3. The set of distributions Q that fulﬁlls the information
constraint and have a ﬁxed marginal µ on I is convex.
The theorem follows from the next lemma. Indeed, observe that
HQ(i) is a constant c over all distributions Q having marginal µ on I,
and by setting X = K and Y = I ×J in the lemma it follows that the
set of all distributions Q on I × J × K with HQ(i,j|k) ≥ c is convex.
Lemma 1. For any ﬁnite set X and Y , the function Q  → HQ(y|x) is
concave on the set of probability measures on X × Y .
Proof. Follows from the concavity of entropy. Let ¯ Q =
 
m λmQm be
a ﬁnite convex combination of distributions over X × Y . Consider a
triple of random variables α,β,γ such that P(γ = m) = λm, and α,β
has law Qm conditional on γ = m. Then






Any pair of correlated strategies is a distribution over pure strate-
gies. Therefore, the average distribution induced by a pair of correlated
strategies is a convex combination the average distributions induced by
those pure strategies, and hence fulﬁlls, by Theorem 3, the information
constraint. We conclude that for every pair of correlated strategies σ,τ
and every t, Qt
 ,σ,τ fulﬁlls the information constraint, and thus every
10distribution that is implementable by a pair of correlated strategies
fulﬁlls the information constraint.
On the other hand, Theorem 2 shows that every distribution Q that
fulﬁlls the information constraint and has marginal QI = µ is im-
plementable by pure strategies (and thus in particular by correlated
strategies).
5. Proof of Theorem 1













≥ H(i1,...it) = tH(µ)
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that kt is a function of








This completes the proof of the ﬁrst part of the result. The second part
follows from the fact that the maps Q  → HQ(i,j|k) and Q  → HQ(i)
are continuous and therefore the set of distributions Q that obey the
information constraint is closed.
6. Proof of Theorem 2
Given a distribution Q that fulﬁlls the information constraint and
that has marginal µ on X, we construct strategies σ,τ of the forecaster
and the agent such that the long-run average distribution induced ap-
proximates Q. Strategies are deﬁned over blocks of length n. During
each block, the forecaster communicates to the agent which sequence
of actions to play during the next block. The sequences of actions for
the agent are chosen in a subset An of Kn called the set of action plans.
11The property required on the set of action plans is that, given the se-
quence ˜ x of actions of nature during a block, there exists an element
˜ z in An such that the empirical distribution of (˜ x, ˜ z) during a block is
close to QI×K. The possible set of messages Mn(˜ x, ˜ z) for the forecaster
during a block corresponds to sequences of actions ˜ y, such that (˜ x, ˜ y, ˜ z)
has an empirical distribution close to Q.
Our proof relies on estimates of the sizes of the sets of messages and
the set of action plans needed for the forecaster and the agent. The
key to the proof is that the information constraint implies that the set
of messages has cardinality larger than the set of action plans.
6.1. Typical sequences. Given a ﬁnite sequence b = (b1,...,bn) ∈
Bn over a ﬁnite alphabet B, the type ρ(b) of b is its empirical distribu-
tion (i.e., ρ(b)(c) = 1
n
 n
i=1 Ibi=c, for c ∈ B). Given µ ∈ ∆(B), the type
set of µ is T  (n) = {b ∈ Bn,ρ(b) = µ}. The set of types is Tn(B) =





n|B|. The following estimates the size of a type set µ ∈ Tn(B) (see, for
instance, Cover and Thomas [CT91, Theorem 12.1.3 page 282]):
(3)
2nH( )
(n + 1)|B| ≤ |T
 (n)| ≤ 2
nH( )




The inequalities (3) imply that for every sequence µn ∈ Tn(B) we
have
|T
 n(n)| . = 2
nH( n).
Let A and B be two ﬁnite sets and Q ∈ ∆(A × B), with marginal
distributions QA and QB on A and B, respectively. Fix n ∈ N and
Q ∈ ∆(A × B) such that T Q(n) is nonempty. It follows that the sets
T QA(n) and T QB(n) are also nonempty.
Notation 2. Given sequences ˜ a = (a1,...,an) ∈ An, ˜ b = (b1,...,bn) ∈
Bn, and ˜ c = (c1,...,cn) ∈ Cn, (˜ a,˜ b) and (˜ a,˜ b,˜ c) represent the points
12(a1,b1,...,an,bn) in (A×B)n and (a1,b1,c1 ...,an,bn,cn) in (A×B×
C)n.
Notation 3. Given a probability measure Q over a product set A×B,
QA and QB represent the marginals of Q on A and B, respectively.
Lemma 2. For every ˜ a ∈ T QA(n), we have
|A|
|A×B|2(H(Q)−H(QA))n
(n + 1)|A×B| ≤ |{˜ b ∈ B
n : (˜ a,˜ b) ∈ T
Q(n)}| ≤ 2
(H(Q)−H(QA))n
and thus in particular
|{˜ b ∈ B
n : ρ(˜ a,˜ b) = Q}| . = 2
(H(Q)−H(QA))n.
Proof. The point ˜ a ∈ An partitions the set {1,...,n} into |A| dis-
joint subsets Na, a ∈ A: Na = {1 ≤ i ≤ n : xi = a}. For a ∈ A
we denote by Qa the conditional distribution on B given a, namely,
Qa(b) = Q(a,b)/
 
b∈B Q(a,b). For every point ˜ b ∈ Bn and a subset
N of {1,2,...,n} we denote by (˜ b|N) the N-vector (˜ bj)j∈N. Note that
for every ˜ b ∈ Bn we have ρ(˜ a,˜ b) = Q if and only if for every a ∈ A we
have ρ(˜ b|Na) = Qa. Therefore, it follows from (3) that
Πa∈A
2H(Qa)|Na|
(|Na| + 1)|B| ≤ |{˜ b ∈ B
n : ρ(˜ a,˜ b) = Q}| ≤ Πa∈A2
H(Qa)|Na|.
The result follows since Πa∈A(|Na| + 1)|B| ≤ (n + 1)|A×B|/|A||A×B| and
Πa∈A2H(Qa)|Na| = 2(H(Q)−H(QA))n. ￿
6.2. Set of action plans. We now prove for every Q the existence of
a sequence of subsets An of Kn of size
|An| . = 2
(H(QI)+H(QK)−H(Q))n
such that for every ˜ x ∈ T QI(n), there exists ˜ z ∈ An with (˜ x, ˜ z) ∈ T Q(n).
Lemma 3. For Q ∈ Tn(I ×K), there exists a subset An of T QK(n) of
size less than or equal to 1 + H(QI)n(n + 1)|I×K|2(H(QI)+H(QK)−H(Q))n
such that, for every ˜ x ∈ T QI(n) there exists ˜ z ∈ An with (˜ x, ˜ z) ∈ T Q(n).
Proof. Let Q ∈ Tn(I × K). If H(QI) = 0 we set An = {˜ z} where ˜ z is
an arbitrary element of T QK(n). We now assume H(QI) > 0.
13Let (Zk)k≥1 be a sequence of T QK(n)-valued i.i.d.random variables
where Zk,1 is uniformly distributed on T QK(n). Let An be a random
subset of T QK(n) of size
α(n) = ⌈H(QI)n(n + 1)
|I×K|2
(H(QI)+H(QK)−H(Q))n⌉
containing {Z1,...,Zα(n)}. Denote by P the induced probability over
realizations of the Zk’s. By Lemma 2, the number of elements ˜ z ∈
T QK(n) such that (˜ x, ˜ z) ∈ T Q(n) is no less than 2(H(Q)−H(QI))n
(n+1)|I×K| . By
equation (3), |T QK(n)| ≤ 2H(QK)n. Therefore, for any ˜ x ∈ T QI(n) and





From this, we deduce that
P(∀˜ z ∈ An,(˜ x, ˜ z)  ∈ T









Hence, the expected number of ˜ x ∈ T QI(n) such that ∀˜ z ∈ An,(˜ x, ˜ z)  ∈
T Q(n) is at most exp(−nH(QI))|T QI(n)|, which by equation (3) is
bounded by e−nH(QI)2nH(QI) < 1. Therefore, there exists a realization
An of the random set An that veriﬁes the condition. ￿
6.3. Approximation of probabilities.
Lemma 4. ∀ε > 0 ∃N(ε) such that ∀ ˜ Q ∈ ∆(I × J × K) ∀n ≥ N(ε)
∃Q ∈ Tn(I × J × K) such that
(4) HQ(i,j|k) − HQ(i) ≥ (1 − 3ε)(H ˜ Q(i,j|k) − H ˜ Q(i)) + ε
and
(5)  Q − ˜ Q 1 < 7ε
Proof. Let A := J × K. The (real-valued) entropy functions R  →
HR(i,j|k) and R  → HR(i) deﬁned on ∆(I × A) are continuous, and
thus uniformly continuous. Therefore, for every ε > 0 there is N(ε) >
14|I ×A|/ε, such that for every R,R′ ∈ ∆(I ×A) with  R−R′ 1 ≤ |I ×
A|/N(ε) we have |HR(i,j|k)−HR′(i,j|k)| < ε and |HR(i)−HR′(i)| < ε.
Let R be the product distribution ˜ QI ×UJ × ˜ QK on I ×A where UJ is
the uniform distribution over J.
Then HR(i,j|k) = H ˜ Q(i)+log|J|. Let Rε = 3εR+(1−3ε) ˜ Q. Then,
using the concavity of the entropy function R  → HR(i,j|k) (Lemma
1), the equality Rε
I = ˜ QI, and the inequality log|J| ≥ 1 (which follows
from |J| ≥ 2), we have






I) ≥ (1 − 3ε)(H ˜ Q(i,j|k) − H(R
ε
I)) + 3ε
Let Q ∈ ∆(I × A) with T Q(n)  = ∅ and  Q − Rε 1 ≤ |I × A|/n.
Therefore, for n ≥ N(ε) we have |HQ(i,j|k) − HRε(i,j|k)| < ε and
|HQ(i) − HRε(i)| < ε and therefore
HQ(i,j|k) − HQ(i) ≥ (1 − 3ε)(H ˜ Q(i,j|k) − H ˜ Q(i) + ε
which proves (4). In addition
 Q − ˜ Q 1 <  Q − R
ε 1 +  R
ε − ˜ Q 1 ≤ 7ε
￿
Lemma 5. Fix ν ∈ ∆(I) and n such that T ν(n)  = ∅. For every
˜ x = (x1,...,xn) ∈ In there is ˜ x′ = (x′
1,...,x′
n) ∈ T ν(n) such that
|{t : xt  = x
′
t}| ≤ n ρ(˜ x) − ν 1
Proof. By induction on the integer d(˜ x) := n ρ(˜ x) − ν 1. If d(˜ x) = 0
set ˜ x′ = ˜ x. Assume that d(˜ x) > 0. There exist elements i,i′ ∈ I such
that ρ(˜ x)(i) > ν(i) and ρ(˜ x)(i′) < ν(i′). Pick t ∈ {1 ≤ t′ ≤ n : xt′ = i}
and deﬁne ˜ x′′ ∈ In by x′′
k = xk if k  = t, and x′′
t = i′. It follows that
d(x′′) = d(x) − 2 and therefore by the induction hypothesis there is
˜ x′ ∈ Tn(ν) such that |{t : x′′
t  = x′
t}| ≤ d(x′′) and therefore |{t : x′
t  =
xt}| ≤ d(x′′) + 2 = d(x). ￿
15Corollary 1. Fix ν ∈ ∆(I) and n such that T ν(n)  = ∅. There exists
a map f : In → T ν(n) such that for µ ∈ ∆(I) we have
P  ⊗n(
 
1≤t≤n Ixt =ft(˜ x) >  ν − µ 1n + εn) ≤
|I|2
ε2n
Proof. Let f : In → T ν(n) be the function that maps ˜ x ∈ In to the
element ˜ x′ ∈ T ν(n), as in Lemma 5. For every i ∈ I we have |ρ(˜ x)(i)−
µ(i)| ≥ ε
|I| whenever |ρ(˜ x)(i)−ν(i)| ≥ |µ(i)−ν(i)|+ ε
|I|. Therefore, by
using Chebyshev’s inequality we have







P ⊗n ( ρ(˜ x) − ν 1 ≥  µ − ν 1 + ε) ≤
|I|2
ε2n
Hence the result, since
 
1≤t≤n Ixt =ft(˜ x) ≤ n ρ(˜ x) − ν 1. ￿
6.4. Construction of the strategies. Fix Q ∈ ∆(I × J × I) that
satisﬁes the conditions of Theorem 2. Note that it suﬃces to prove
that for every ε > 0 there exists a strategy proﬁle σ,τ and t(ε,σ,τ)
such that
∀ t ≥ t(ε,σ,τ)  Q
t
 ,σ,τ − Q 1 < ε
Indeed, from a sequence of strategy proﬁles that approximate Q closer
and closer, one can construct a strategy that implements Q.
Let Q′ ∈ ∆(I ×J ×K) be as in Lemma 4 such that (4) and (5) hold.
By assumption we have HQ(i,j|k) ≥ HQ(i), and therefore we deduce
from (4) that
(6) HQ′(i,j|k) ≥ HQ′(i) + ε
By Lemma 3 there exists a set of action plans An ⊂ T Q′
K(n) for the
agent such that











and such that for every ˜ x ∈ T Q′
I(n), there exists an action plan ˜ z ∈ An
of the agent such that (˜ x, ˜ z) ∈ T
Q′




M(˜ x, ˜ z) = {˜ y ∈ T
Q′
J(n) : (˜ x, ˜ y, ˜ z) ∈ T
Q′
(n)}
By Lemma 2 we have







Since by (4) we have HQ′(j|i,k) > H(Q′
I) + H(Q′
K) − H(Q′) + ε, for
n suﬃciently large |M(˜ x, ˜ z)| ≥ |An|. Therefore there exist maps m˜ x,˜ z
from M(˜ x, ˜ z) onto An. In what follows, m
−1
˜ x,˜ z stands for a function from
An into M(˜ x, ˜ z) such that m˜ x,˜ z ◦ m
−1
˜ x,˜ z is the identity on An.
By Corollary 1, for n suﬃciently large (e.g., n ≥ |I|2/ε3), there exists






t=1 Ixt =ft(˜ x)) > 8ε) < ε
Let r: In → An such that (f(˜ x),r(˜ x)) ∈ T
Q′
I×K(n) for every x ∈ In.
Fix a point (˜ x(0), ˜ z(0)) ∈ T
Q′
I×K(n) and for b > 1 deﬁne (˜ x(b), ˜ y(b), ˜ z(b))
to be the coordinates of the play at stages bn + 1,...,bn + n, namely,
(˜ x(b), ˜ y(b), ˜ z(b)) = (xbn+1,ybn+1,zbn+1,...,xbn+n,ybn+n,zbn+n)
The strategy σ of the agent plays at stages t = 1,...,n the sequence
of actions z(0). At stages t = (b+1)n+1,...,(b+2)n the agent plays the
sequence z(b + 1) = mf(˜ x(b)),˜ z(b)(˜ y(b)) if (f(˜ x(j)), ˜ y(j), ˜ z(j)) ∈ T Q′(n)
and z(0) otherwise. The strategy τ of the forecaster plays at stages
t = 1,...,n the sequence of actions m
−1
˜ x(0),˜ z(0)(r(˜ x(1))), and at stages
t = bn + 1,...,bn + n the sequence m
−1
f(˜ x(b)),˜ z(b)(r(˜ x(b + 1))).
It follows that for every b ≥ 1 we have (f(˜ x(b)), ˜ y(b), ˜ z(b)) ∈ T Q′(n).
Hence
 ρ(˜ x(b), ˜ y(b), ˜ z(b)) − Q




P ⊗n( ρ(˜ x(b), ˜ y(b), ˜ z(b)) − Q
′ 1 ≥ 8ε) ≤ ε
and as  ρ(˜ x(b), ˜ y(b), ˜ z(b)) − Q′ 1 ≤ 2 we have
 E ⊗n(ρ(˜ x(b), ˜ y(b), ˜ z(b)) − Q
′ 1 ≤ 10ε
17Hence, for suﬃciently large t
 Q
t
 ,σ,τ − Q




 ,σ,τ − Q 1 ≤ 18ε
This ends the proof of Theorem 2.
7. Payoffs and equilibria
We show in this section how the information constraint yields char-
acterizations of 1) the set of feasible payoﬀs, 2) the best payoﬀ a team
can achieve, and 3) the set of equilibrium payoﬀs in repeated games.
7.1. Feasible payoﬀs. Consider a ﬁxed payoﬀ function g deﬁned on
action triples (g : I × J × K → R2) and deﬁne the set F by
F = {EQg(i,j,k) : Q veriﬁes the information constraint and QI = µ}
The objective of this section is to demonstrate that the set F is a good
approximation for the set of feasible payoﬀs of the discounted games.
The approximation applies not only to interstage-time-independent dis-
counting (i.e, a ﬁxed discount factor), but also for interstage-time-
dependent discounting.
The commonly used discounting valuation is obtained by specifying
an interstage-time-independent discount factor 0 < λ < 1 and evaluat-
ing a steam (gt)t of payoﬀs according to its weighted average
 ∞
t=1 θtgt,
where θt = (1−λ)λt−1. The factor 1−λ is a normalization factor mak-
ing the sum of θt equal 1. Interstage-time-dependent discount factors
lead to a weighted average valuation
 ∞
t=1 θtgt, where θ = (θt)t is a
nonincreasing sequence with
 ∞
t=1 θt = 1.
If θ = (θt)t is a nonincreasing sequence of nonnegative numbers
summing to 1, then the expectation of the (θ)t-weighted sum of the
stage payoﬀs, g(θ,σ,τ) := EPµ,σ,τ
 ∞
t=1 θtg(it,jt,kt), equals the expec-













t=1(θt − θt+1)t = 1 we deduce that Q is a convex combination
of Qt
σ,τ and thus obeys the information constraint, and obviously has
marginal µ on I. Therefore, if Σf and Σa denote the sets of strategies
of the forecaster and the agent, respectively, we have
Proposition 1. For every nonincreasing sequence θ = (θt) with (the
normalization)
 ∞
t=1 θt = 1, the set of θ-weighted feasible payoﬀs,
Fθ = {Eσ,τ, 
 ∞
t=1 θtg(it,jt,kt) : (σ,τ) ∈ Σf × Σa}
is a subset of F. In particular, for every 0 < λ < 1, if Fλ is the
set of feasible payoﬀs of the λ-discounted game, i.e., Fλ = Fθ(λ) where
(θ(λ))t = (1 − λ)λt−1, then
Fλ ⊂ F
On the other hand, if Q is implementable then there is a strategy
pair σ,τ such that for every ε > 0 there exists N suﬃciently large
so that  Qn
σ,τ − Q  < ε for every n ≥ N. Therefore, if θ = (θt)t is






σ,τ −Q  =  
 ∞
t=1(θt−θt+1)t(Qt
σ,τ −Q)  < 2Nθ1+ε (by the triangle
inequality and the equality and inequalities 0 ≤
 N
t=1(θt − θt+1)t =
 N
t=1 θt − NθN+1 ≤ Nθ1), and therefore for suﬃciently small θ1 the
distribution Qθ
σ,τ is within 2ε of the distribution Q. Therefore,
Proposition 2. Fθ converges (in the Hausdorﬀ metric) to F as θ1
goes to 0. In particular, Fλ → F as λ → 1−.
7.2. Team games. Team games, in which players’ preferences are
identical, form an adequate setup for the study of ineﬃciencies due
the asymmetric information and the communication costs. As shown
for instance by Marschak and Radner [MR72] and by Arrow [Arr85], a
ﬁrm can be described as a team when one focuses on the question of
information transmission between its members.
In team games, our model allows us to measure the ineﬃciencies
arising from the need to transmit information. As a benchmark, con-
sider the situation in which the agent also has complete information
19about the states of nature. Then, it is possible for the forecaster and
the agent to choose optimally an action pair at each stage given the
current state of nature. The corresponding expected payoﬀ is the best
achievable under complete information.
In the game we analyze, both players can use a myopic behavior
that seeks to maximize at each stage the payoﬀ of the current stage. In
this case, the forecaster’s actions are uninformative about the future
of the process, and so the agent’s belief on the current temporal state
of nature is his prior belief. Such behavior rules are not optimal in
general. Indeed, in most games the team can secure a better payoﬀ
if the forecaster deviates from a myopic maximization rule in order to
convey information to the agent.
As we see, a good joint behavior for the forecaster must seek to
communicate maximal information with the slightest deviation from a
stage payoﬀ maximization rule.
Therefore, the problem of ﬁnding a rule for the team that maximizes
the long-run expected payoﬀ and of computing the exact value that
can be achieved is a diﬃcult one. Yet it is made particularly simple by
an approach through the information constraint.
The long-run average payoﬀ is the expectation of the stage payoﬀ
where the expectation is with respect to the long-run average of action
triples. Therefore, for any (σ,τ) ∈ Σf × Σa, the expected long-run
payoﬀ is the expectation of the stage payoﬀ with respect to Qσ,τ – the
expected long-run average of the distribution of action triples induced
by σ,τ, and Qσ,τ obeys the information constraint.
 ∞
t=1 θtgt
Let vλ be the maximum payoﬀ for the team when the discount factor
is λ, i.e., vλ = max{x : (x,x) ∈ Fλ, and let v = max{x : (x,x) ∈ F.
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that
Proposition 3. When λ goes to 1−, vλ goes to v.
20We are thus able to characterize the best achievable payoﬀ to the
team, and its degree of ineﬃciency compared to the full information
case, and to construct strategies that achieve this maximal payoﬀ.
Our model thus applies to the study of the impact of communication
costs on team games, which is an important question in the theory of
organizations (see van Zandt [vZ99] for a survey). The information
constraint does not depend on the speciﬁcation of payoﬀs to the team.
Since it characterizes the set of achievable distributions, it allows us
to write the maximization problem faced by the team in a simple and
compact way for any payoﬀ speciﬁcation.
7.2.1. Example: bounded communication. The agent makes a decision
at each stage in K, and the payoﬀ to the team depends on the state of
nature and on the agent’s action. The forecaster has incentives to send
the maximal information to the agent. Depending on µ and on the size
of J, it may or may not be possible to send all the relevant information
to the agent. A choice then needs to be made about what information
is to be sent, such that only the most important information reaches
the agent.
Consider, for example, the following common-interests game where
the state of nature speciﬁes the matrix, the forecaster is the row player,
and the agent is the column player. The states of nature follow an
i.i.d.and uniform sequence. Payoﬀs of the team are given by
1 2 3
1 1 0 0
2 1 0 0
1
1 2 3
1 0 1 0
2 0 1 0
2
1 2 3
1 0 0 1
2 0 0 1
3
Let us illustrate the use of the information constraint in computing
the maximal payoﬀ that the team of the forecaster and the agent can
approach. Let Q be an implementable distribution that maximizes
the common payoﬀ; i.e., the distribution Q maximizes the probability
Q(i=k) subject to HQ(i,j|k) ≥ HQ(i). Obviously, by replacing the
21distribution Q with the product distribution of the uniform distribution
UJ on J and the marginal distribution QI×K we obtain a distribution
ˆ Q with EQg(i,j,k) = E ˆ Qg(i,j,k) and H ˆ Q(i,j|k) ≥ H ˆ Q(i). Therefore
we can assume w.l.o.g.that Q is the product distribution UJ ⊗ QI×K,
and thus the information constraint is





Note that the common payoﬀ depends only on the values of Q(i=k=1),
Q(i=k=2), and Q(i=k=3), and equals their sum. By symmetry and by
concavity of the map Q  → HQ(i|k) (Lemma 1) we can assume w.l.o.g.
that x = Q(i=k=1) = Q(i=k=2) = Q(i=k=3). Given this inequal-
ity, the conditional entropy HQ(i|k) is maximized when Q(i=2|k=1) =
Q(i=3|k=1) and thus Q(i=j=k) = (1
3−x)/2, Q(i=3|k=2) = Q(i=1|k=2) =
(1
3 − x)/2, and Q(=1|k=3) = Q(i=2|k=3) = (1
3 − x)/2. Therefore, we





x if i = k
1
3−x
2 if i  = k
and thus HQ(i|k) = H(3x)+1−3x, implying that the maximal payoﬀ
is the solution v of the equation H(x) + (1 − x)/2 = log 3
2.
The set of equilibrium payoﬀs of the repeated game is the set {(y,y) :
1
3 ≤ y ≤ v} of all individual rational and feasible payoﬀs.
7.3. Games with diﬀerent interests. We now consider general pay-
oﬀ functions gf,ga.
We compare the set of equilibrium payoﬀs of our model with the
“silent” equilibrium payoﬀs in which no information is transmitted,
and with the communication equilibrium payoﬀs.
Deﬁne the set of “silent” feasible payoﬀs as
F
S = co {E (g
f(i,α(i),k),g
a(i,α(i),k)), α: I → J, k ∈ K}
22where co stands for the convex hull. At the other extreme, the set of
feasible payoﬀs under full communication is
F
C = co {E (g
f(i,α(i),β(i)),g
a(i,α(i),β(i))), α: I → J, β: I → K}
Finally, deﬁne the set of feasible payoﬀs with internal communica-
tion as F; recall that F = {EQg(i,j,k) : Q veriﬁes the information
constraint and µ = QI}.
We have the inclusions
F
S ⊆ F ⊆ F
C
The set of distributions Q that veriﬁes the information constraint is
convex by Theorem 3 and closed, and obviously the set of distributions
Q with QI = µ is convex and closed. Therefore the set of feasible
payoﬀs F is a closed convex subset of R2. The closed convex set F is
deﬁned by its support function
x  → max
y∈F
 x,y  x ∈ R
2
where  x,y  stands for the inner product of x and y. Given x ∈ R2,
the value maxy∈F x,y  of the support function equals the maximal
payoﬀ that the team of the forecaster and the agent can achieve in
the game with common-interests where the common payoﬀ function
g(i,j,k) equals the inner product  x,(gf(i,j,k),ga(i,j,k)) . Therefore,
solving for the feasible set F amounts to solving a family of (two-
person)2 common-interests games.
The individually rational level of a player is deﬁned as the best payoﬀ
that this player can defend against every strategy of the other player.
















2In fact, as the implementing strategies in our proof are pure, it follows that solving
a family of two-person common-interests games suﬃces for computing the feasible
set of payoﬀs in the model where there are several forecasters and several agents.
23The situation is asymmetric between the two players. Indeed, the
forecaster possesses a double advantage over the agent. First, he can
use his private information concerning the states of nature in order
to defend a better payoﬀ against the agent, which results in a higher
individually rational level for the forecaster. Second, he can use this
information against the agent when punishing him, which induces a
lower individually rational payoﬀ for the agent. The better-informed
player possesses a strategic advantage over the less-informed one. Let








The set F S ∩ IR corresponds to the set of equilibrium payoﬀs of
games with large discount factors in which the forecaster uses silent
strategies that may depend on the current state of nature, but not on
future ones. In these equilibria, the agent is uninformed as to future
states of nature.
The set F C ∩ IR is the set of communication equilibrium payoﬀs of
the repeated game with large discount factors. In this case, there is no
restriction on the communication possibilities, nor on the costs of this
communication.3
Finally, F ∩IR is the set of equilibrium payoﬀs of our original game
with large discount factors, where all communication is internal to the
game. This set is convex, but not a polyhedron. It is computed directly
from the information constraint, and reﬂects the costs of communica-
tion between the players.4
7.3.1. Example: Secret Cournot collusion. Consider a production game
in which the forecaster and the agent form a Cournot duopoly, and
choose production levels qp,qa in ﬁnite sets Qp and Qa at unit costs
3should we explain more why the incentive constraints do note appear ? FF was
surprised.
4In the last two cases, all information sent by the forecaster concerning future states
of nature is eventually veriﬁable by the agent. Therefore the truthtelling incentive
constraints are not active.
24cp,ca. A state of nature is a pair of positive numbers (A,B). The
market inverse demand function is p = A − B(qp + qa), and proﬁts
are gp = p(qp − cp), ga = p(qa − ca). Since the forecaster has better
information about future market demand, it may be proﬁtable to share
part of this information with the agent. All explicit communication
between the ﬁrms (through phone lines for instance) is prohibited by
law. Nevertheless, nothing prevents the forecaster from transmitting
information through his choices of production levels.
8. Discussion and extensions
In order to preserve maximum transparency, we have tried to keep
the model of Section 2, henceforth the basic model as simple as pos-
sible. Notably, this has led to greatly simpliﬁed assumptions on the
forecasting ability, the signalling structure of the game, and the dis-
tribution of the process. The aim of this section is to present various
extensions and variations of the basic model, and to show how the
analysis of implementable distributions through the information con-
straint can be adapted to these cases. We ﬁrst discuss relaxations of
the perfect and inﬁnite forecast assumption. Second, we examine the
impact of the signaling structure of the one-shot game on the the set
of implementable distributions. Third, we show how autocorrelations
of the process of states of nature can reduce the need for information
transmission and expand the set of achievable distributions. Next, we
illustrate that our main result is robust in the sense that small devi-
ations from the main assumptions lead to a small change in the set
of implementable distributions. Finally, we discuss the possibilities of
asymmetric information on both sides as an open problem.
8.1. Limited forecasting abilities. The assumption of perfect and
inﬁnite forecast can be relaxed in two ways. First, we can assume that
the forecaster is able to make predictions on a ﬁnite number of future
25stages of nature. Second, we may introduce possibilities of inaccurate
predictions.
8.1.1. Finite forecasts. Say that the forecaster has f forecast if, before
stage t, the forecaster is informed of it,...,it+f−1. Remark that any
strategy that is implementable with f forecast is implementable with
perfect forecast. Note also that the strategies constructed in the proof
of Theorem 2 use f forecast for larger and larger values of f. Hence,
the set of implementable distributions with f forecast converges as f
goes to ∞ to the implementable distributions of the basic model.
8.1.2. Imperfect forecasts. We now discuss the case where the forecaster
may be imperfectly informed of the states of nature. Let S be a set
of signals for the forecaster, and let R be a transition probability from
I to S. Assume that before the game starts, the forecaster observes
a sequence of signal (st)t where each signal st is drawn independently
according to the probability R(it). Following the plat at stage t the
agent observes a stochastic signal that includes the action jt of the
forecaster, and the forecaster observes a stochastic signal that depends
on the action triple (it,jt,kt). The basic model corresponds to the case
of perfect monitoring and perfect forecasts (where S = I and R is the
identity matrix).
In this case, a distribution Q ∈ ∆(J) × ∆(I × K) with QI = µ is
implementable if and only if there exists a distribution ˆ Q ∈ ∆(S ×I ×
J ×K) with ˆ Q(s|i) = R(i)(s) and marginal Q on I ×J ×K such that
(1) ˆ Q(i|s,j,k) = ˆ Q(i|s)
(2) H ˆ Q(j) ≥ H ˆ Q(s) − H ˆ Q(s|k)
Condition(2) is the usual information constraints on Q. Condition
(1) expresses the fact that all information players have on the current
state of nature comes from the signal s of the forecaster.
If the signal to the agent, following the play at stage t, includes st in
addition to jt, then a distribution Q ∈ ∆(J × I × K) with QI = µ is
26implementable if and only if there exists a distribution ˆ Q ∈ ∆(S ×I ×
J ×K) with ˆ Q(s|i) = R(i)(s) and marginal Q on I ×J ×K such that
(1) ˆ Q(i|s,j,k) = ˆ Q(i|s)
(2) H ˆ Q(j,s|k) ≥ H ˆ Q(s)
8.2. Signalling structures. , In the basic model, we have assumed
that the stage game has perfect monitoring in the sense that both the
forecaster and the agent were perfectly informed of the action triple
played at each stage.
As a general property, any reduction of the informational content
of the signals received by the forecaster or by the agent concerning
the action triple results in a reduction of the set of implementable dis-
tributions. In other words, all distributions that are implementable
with more informative signals are also implementable with less infor-
mative ones. This follows from the fact that implementable strategies
with less informative signals are also implementable when signals are
informative.
We now discuss the eﬀects of a change either in the forecaster’s
observation of the agent’s action, or in the agent’s observation of the
forecaster’s action, or in the agent’s observation of the current state of
nature.
8.2.1. Unobservable agent’s actions. We discuss here the situation where
the forecaster observes at each stage a signal on the agent’s actions.
The basic model corresponds to the case where this signal is fully in-
formative. Consider the strategies constructed in the proof of Theorem
2. Since the agent uses a pure strategy, which depends on the observed
past states of nature and the forecaster’s actions only, and since this
information is available to the forecaster, the forecaster can reconsti-
tute this information even if the signal received on these actions is
completely uninformative. Hence, the designed strategies can still be
used. The set of implementable distributions is thus unchanged under
27the assumption that the forecaster has imperfect monitoring on the
agent’s actions.
In particular, the characterization of Proposition 3 of the limit Pareto
payoﬀ to the team for a discount factor λ arbitrarily close to 0 remains
unchanged.
Note however that the set of equilibrium payoﬀs in the repeated
games with diﬀerent interests is modiﬁed. Indeed, some deviations of
the agent that are detectable under perfect monitoring may become
undetectable under imperfect monitoring.
8.2.2. Noisy signal of forecaster’s action. We contemplate the situa-
tion where the agent observes the temporal states of nature but does
not have perfect monitoring of the forecaster’s actions. The distribu-
tion of the signal s ∈ S depends on the triple (i,j,k); the conditional
distribution of s given (i,j,k) is denoted by Ri,j,k (∈ ∆(S)).
Given a distribution Q on I×J ×K we denote by ˆ Q the distribution
on I×J ×K×S whose marginal on I×J ×K equals Q and ˆ Q(s|i,j,k)
equals the probability of the signal s given action triple i,j,k, namely,
ˆ Q(s|i,j,k) = Ri,j,k(s). Using this notation, Q is implementable if and
only if QI = µ and
(7) H ˆ Q(s|i,k) − H ˆ Q(s|i,j,k) ≥ HQ(i) − HQ(i|k)
Notice that in the case of the basic model, H ˆ Q(s|i,k) = HQ(j|i,k) and
H ˆ Q(s|i,j,k) = 0 and thus equation (7) particularizes to the information
constraint HQ(j|i,k) ≥ I(i;k).
Two special cases of the above characterization that are consid-
ered below are reformulations of classical results in information theory:
Shannon’s Noisy Channel Capacity theorem (see, e.g., [CT91, Theorem
8.7.1, p. 198]), and the Rate Distortion theorem for i.i.d. sources (see,
e.g., [CT91, Theorem 13.2.1, p. 342]).
First, consider the special case where the distribution Ri,j,k(s) de-
pends on j only and I = K. The information constraint 7 for a distri-
bution Q such that Q(i = k) = 1 is H(s) − H(s|j) = I(s;j) ≥ H(i).
28Note also that a distribution Q with Q(i = k) = 1 is implementable if
and only if it is implementable in the variant of the model where the
forecaster does not observe the actions of the agent and the agent does
not observe that states of nature. Deﬁne the capacity of a stochastic
signal s as the maximum over the random variable j of the mutual
information I(s;j). Thus, our result shows that there exists an im-
plementable distribution Q such that Q(i = k) = 1 if and only if the
capacity of s exceeds H(i). This is equivalent to the classical Shannon’s
Noisy Channel Capacity theorem for i.i.d. sources.
Second, assume that Ri,j,k(s) depends on j only. The information
constraint 7 for a distribution Q ∈ ∆(S) × ∆(I × K) is I ˆ Q(s;j) ≥
IQ(i;k). Indeed, for such a product distribution Q we have H ˆ Q(s|i,k) =
H ˆ Q(s) and H ˆ Q(s|i,j,k) = H ˆ Q(s|j). Therefore, the left hand side of
inequality 7 equals I ˆ Q(s;j). Note that I ˆ Q(s;j) depends only on QJ and
IQ(i;k) depends only on QI×K.
Fix µ ∈ ∆(I). Now assume that the payoﬀ function does not depend
on j, i.e., g(i,j,k) = d(i,k), and let R(D) be the min of IP(i;k) when
P is a distribution on I × K such that PI = µ and EPd(i,k) ≥ D.
Let ν ∈ ∆(J). Our result implies that there exists an implementable
distribution Q ∈ ∆(J)×∆(I×K) with EQd(i,k) ≥ D and QI×J = ν⊗µ
if and only if I ˆ Q(s;j) ≥ R(D). Moreover, the implementability of a
distribution Q ∈ ∆(J) × ∆(I × K) does not depend on the agent
observing the states of nature. This generalizes the Rate Distortion
theorem for i.i.d. sources (see, e.g., [CT91, Theorem 13.2.1, p. 342]).
Indeed, when the agent observes the actions of the forecaster, i.e., s = j,
we have I ˆ Q(s;j) = Hν(j) and the 1/n fraction of the logarithm in base 2
of the number of typical words with the alphabet J of length n having
empirical distribution ν converges as n → ∞ to Hν(j).
8.2.3. Unobservable current state of nature. Consider now the case
where the agent observes the forecaster’s actions, but is uninformed
of the current state of nature.
29The characterization of the full set of implementable distributions
in this case is beyond the scope of this paper. However, consider the
subset R of distributions on I × J × K that are the product of a
distribution on J and a distribution on I × K.
Following a similar analysis to the one of our basic model, one can
prove that a distribution Q ∈ R is implementable if and only if
HQ(j) ≥ I(i,k)
If the agent also does not have perfect monitoring of the forecaster’s
actions, but receives a signal s as a function of forecaster’s action j,
we proceed as in Section 8.2.2. Consider the conditional distribution
of s given j by Rj ∈ ∆(S). Following the same notation we obtain
that a distribution Q that is a product of a distribution on J and a
distribution on I × K is implementable if and only if QI = µ and
H ˆ Q(s) − H ˆ Q(s|j) ≥ IQ(i,k) = HQ(i) − HQ(i|k)
8.3. State of nature processes. In a forthcoming paper we analyze
the variant of the basic model, where the temporal states of nature
follow a Markov chain. In that case the temporal distribution of the
state of nature in stage t + 1 is correlated to the distribution of the
state in stage t. The adequate element of study is the expected long-
run average Q of the distribution of the quadruple (it−1,it,jt,kt). Let
Q be a distribution on I×I×J×K, and (i′,i,j,k) have distribution Q.
A Markov chain eventually enters into an ergodic class of states.
As players observe past temporal states of nature, they are eventu-
ally informed of the ergodic class entered by the chain, and it suﬃces
to study the expected long-run average in the case of an irreducible
Markov chain. Let µ be the invariant measure on I and let T denote
the transition matrix of the Markov chain. The marginal on I×I of an
implementable distribution Q (on I × I × J × K) is deduced from the
law of the Markov chain: Q(i′ = i′,i = i) = µ(i′)Ti′,i. It turns out that
a distribution Q is implementable if and only if its marginal on I × I
coincides with the marginal imposed by the Markov chain transitions
30and
(8) HQ(i,j | k,i
′) ≥ HQ(i | i
′)
This last condition thus describes the information constraint when the
process of states of nature follows a Markov chain.
We now compare the set of implementable distributions under the
i.i.d.and the Markov assumptions. Assume that Q ∈ ∆(I × J × K)
has marginal µ on I and veriﬁes the information constraint under the
i.i.d.assumption: HQ(i,j|k) ≥ HQ(i). Let T be the transition of an
irreducible Markov chain, and Q′ ∈ ∆(I × I × J × K) be the law of
(i′,i,j,k) where
a) (i,j,k) have law Q
b) the law of (i′,i) is deduced from the law of the Markov chain:
Q(i′ = i′ i = i) = µ(i′)Ti′,i
c) Q′(j = j,k = k|i = i,i′ = i′) = Q(j = j,k|i = i).




≥ HQ(i) − HQ(i|k)
= HQ(k) − HQ(k|i)








where the ﬁrst and third equalities follow from (a) and (c), the ﬁrst
inequality follows from the information constraint veriﬁed by Q, the
second inequality follows from the concavity of entropies, and the sec-
ond and last equality follows from instance from the chain rule of en-
tropies. The obtained inequality is then equivalent to the information
constraint for Markov chains 8 applied to Q.
The information constraint is satisﬁed in the Markov case whenever
it is in the i.i.d.case.
31Next consider the Markov chain with state I = {0,1} moving from
state i to state 1 − i, i.e., alternates between the states 0 and 1. The
invariant distribution is 1/2,1/2. If J = K = I then the distribution Q
on I×J×K with QI(0) = 1/2 and Q(i = j = k) = 1 is implementable.
However, it does not satisfy the information constraint.
This shows that the set of implementable distributions is augmented
when one takes advantage of the correlations between successive states
of nature. This is intuitive since in the Markov case, the need for
information transmission is not as important as it is in the i.i.d.case.
In the Markov chain case, the distribution of it given the sequence
of past states i1,...,it−1 is a function of it−1 only. Let νi be the distri-
bution of it given it−1 = i. Deﬁne the random partition of N, N = ∪Ni,
where Ni is the set of all stages t such that it−1 = i. For every i ∈ I
and a strategy pair σ,τ we deﬁne (for every positive integer n) the dis-
tribution Qi,n
σ,τ as the expected empirical distribution of action triples
in stages t ∈ Ni with t ≤ n. The marginal on I of the distribution
Qi,n
σ,τ is νi. Our proof (of the result of the basic model) implies the
following: If Qi ∈ ∆(I ×J ×K) veriﬁes the information constraint and
has marginal νi on I and µ is the invariant distribution of the Markov
chain then the distribution Q =
 
i µ(i)Qi is implementable. Indeed,
by considering the states in each Ni separately, the team can collate
the strategies that implement Qi to a strategy pair σ,τ in the Markov
chain games so that Qi,n
σ,τ converges to Qi and thus as
|{t≤n:t∈Ni}|
n → µ(i)
as n → ∞ we deduce that Q =
 
i µ(i)Qi is implementable.
Now we verify that the distribution Q′ on I × I × J × K deﬁned
















32Our characterization of the implementable distribution in the Markov
chain process implies however additional implementable distributions.
For every real number α say that a distribution Q on I×J×K obeys the
α-information-constraint if HQ(i,j|k) ≥ HQ(i)+α. Note that α can be
either positive or negative or zero. The characterization implies that Q
is implementable if and only if there are distribution Qi ∈ ∆(I×J×K)
with marginals ((Qi)I =) νi on I and constants αi such that 1) Qi obeys
the αi-information-constraint, 2)
 
i µ(i)Qi = Q, and 3)
 
i µ(i)ai = 0.
This comparison of the Markov chain case and the i.i.d. highlight
the need for the forecaster signaling at stages t ∈ Ni on states of nature
in stages t ∈ Ni′ where i  = i′.
8.4. Robustness. We now prove that our characterization of imple-
mentable distributions is robust to small departures from the assump-
tions made in the basic model on the state of nature process, the fore-
sight ability of the forecaster, and the monitoring and forecasting possi-
bilities of the agent. Notice that the analysis of the previous extensions
demonstrate (indirectly) robustness to some speciﬁc departures in each
of these assumptions separately. We wish here to show robustness when
all assumptions are perturbed together and to alow for a wide variety
of perturbations.
We start by describing the dynamics of the temporal states of nature
and the signalling structure of the game: consider a stochastic process
with values (i1,i2,...) in I∞, with distribution P. Nature chooses a
point ω = (i1,i2,...) ∈ I∞ according to the distribution P. Before
the game starts, player n (n = 1,2 in the two-player game) observes a
random signal sn
0 whose distribution depends on the inﬁnite sequence
ω. At stage t player 1 takes action jt ∈ J and player 2 takes an action
kt ∈ K. Following the play at stage t player n observes the realization
of a random signal5 sn
t where the distribution of (s1
t,s2
t) depends on
5In fact, we can assume w.l.o.g. that the signals are moreover deterministic. Indeed,
we can ‘push’ all randomness into I; this will however require an inﬁnite set of
temporal states.
33the triple (ω,jt,kt) of the inﬁnite sequence of temporal states of nature
and the action pair (jt,kt) of the players and conditional on (ω,jt,kt)
is independent of all past signals. The payoﬀ at stage t depends on the
temporal state of nature at stage t and the action pair at stage t.
A strategy of player 1, respectively player 2, speciﬁes the action jt,
respectively kt, at stage t as a function of all his past information,





In order to quantify a small perturbation in this general model we
introduce a proper deﬁnition to measure such perturbation. First, the
stochastic process (I∞,P) is within δ of an i.i.d. process if there exists
µ ∈ ∆(I) and probability distributions ˆ P[n] on (I × I′)m, where I′ is
a copy of I and m = [δ−2], s.t. (i′
n+1,...,i′
n+m) has distribution µ⊗m,
the projection of ˆ P[n] on the m I-coordinates coincides with P, i.e.,
ˆ P[n]In(in+1,...,in+m) = P(in+1,...,in+m|i1,...,in), and
E ˆ P[n](
 n+m
t=n+1 I(it  = i
′
t)) ≤ δ
−1 ∀ suﬃciently large n
An example of a process (with values in IN) that is within δ of
and i.i.d. process is a non-stationary Markov chain (i.e., with time
dependent transitions) where the probabilities Tt(i′,i) of transition at
stage t from state i′ to state i obey
 
i∈I |Tt(i′,i) − µ(i)| < δ| for all
suﬃciently large t.
Second, we say that the forecaster has δ-perfect forecast if for all
suﬃciently large t the forecaster can guess the future m := [1/δ−2]
temporal states of nature so that the expected number of errors is








ℓ=1 I((ft)ℓ  = it+ℓ)) ≤ 1/δ ∀ suﬃciently large t
The agent has δ-perfect monitoring, if, for all suﬃciently large t the
agent can guess the past m := [δ−2] (triples of) action proﬁles so that
the expected number of errors is ≤ 1/δ. Formally, there are functions
34at : (sa
0,...,sa





t−ℓ  = (it−ℓ,jt−ℓ))) ≤ δ
−1 ∀ suﬃciently large t.
The agent has δ-forecast if for every t ≥ 1, every ω = (i1,i2,...)
and ω′ = (i′
1,i′
2,...) (in I∞) with (i1,...,it) = (i′
1,...,i′
t), and every
(jt,kt) ∈ J × K, the distribution of s2
t given (ω,jt,kt) is within6 δ of
its distribution given (ω′,j′
t,k′
t).
Finally, we say that the game model Γ is δ-close to the basic model Γ′
if the process of temporal states of nature is within δ of the i.i.d. µ⊗N,
the forecaster has δ-perfect foresight, the agent has δ-perfect monitor-
ing and δ-forecast.
The robustness theorem states that the set of implementable distri-
butions of a small perturbation of one instance of the basic model is
close to the set of implementable distributions of that instance. For-
mally:
Theorem 4 (The robustness theorem). Let Γ′ be a basic model game.
For every ε > 0 there is δ > 0 such that if Γ is δ-close to Γ′ then
the set of implementable distributions of Γ are within ε of the set of
implementable distributions of Γ′.
Observe that the basic model is the special case where s1
0(ω) = ω,
s2
0(ω) is a constant independent of ω, and sn(it,jt,kt) = (it,jt,kt). The
classical model of repeated games with incomplete information is the
special case where it = it+1 for all t and sn(ω,jt,kt) depends only on
the triple (it,jt,kt).
Remark ﬁnally that an important ingredient of the model described
above is that the dynamics of temporal states of nature i ∈ I (where I
is the ﬁnite set of temporal states of nature) is independent of players’
actions. The even more general model, which is not discussed here,
enables the transition of temporal states to depend also on players’
6If the signal sa
t takes values in a ﬁnite set Sa, then can use the norm distance
between distributions; in the general case we refer to the Kullback Leibler distance.
35actions, and generalizes not only the theory of repeated games with
incomplete information, but also the theory of stochastic games.
8.5. Complementary information. Another important characteris-
tic of the basic model, and of the extensions introduced above, is that
all information about future states of nature possessed by the agent is
also possessed by the forecaster. One may wish to consider extensions
of our models in which both players are partially informed beforehand
of the realized sequence of states of nature.
In such a case, sequential communication schemes, in which informa-
tion is sent back and forth between the players, may be more eﬃcient
than simultaneous schemes in which each player sends information in-
dependently of the information sent by the other, see, e.g., [KN96].
The characterization of the set of implementable distributions in this
model is left as an open problem for future research.
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